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Articles

BEYOND THE ROAR OF THE CROWD: VICTIM IMPACT
TESTIMONY COLLIDES WITH DUE PROCESS
by Marshall N. Perkins
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Victim's Rights
In early Anglo-American law, the victim played
a significant role in the administration of criminal
justice. I As the antecedents to American common law
developed, however, the state replaced the victim as
the prosecuting party in a criminal action. 2 The
evolution of the American criminal justice system
positioned lawyers, rather than victims, as the agents
of the state responsible for prosecuting criminal
activity.3 The diminution of the victim's role in the
criminal justice system reflects the fundamental
principle that criminal offenses are committed against
the community as a whole. 4 In conflict with this
principle of community representation, there are
contemporary concerns that the American criminal
justice system ignores the impact on the victim and
denies the victim participation in the process. s
Originating as a campaign by women's groups to
inform the public about the problems confronting rape
complainants,6 this movement to reform the criminal
justice system has gained momentum, seeking to
accord greater weight to the interests of victims of

ISee Patrick M. Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eyefor an
Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REv. 205, 208 (1992).
2See id.
3See Keith D. Nicholson, Note, Would You Like More Salt with
that Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in Texas, 26 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 1103, 1109 (1995).
Wee Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's
Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187,225 (1995)
("[T]he American system is based on the very notion that
criminal offenses are committed against 'the people. ''').
sSee Craig Edward Gilmore, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Rejection
ofPrecedent, Recognition of Victim Impact Worth, 41 CATH. U.
L. REv. 469, 478-79 (1992).
6See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 1111.

crime. 7
One vehicle developed for vindicating the
interests of victims allows testimony during the
sentencing proceeding by the victim as to the impact
of the crime on the victim's life. 8 The purpose of
allowing the victim an active role in the sentencing
decision is to provide the victim with a sense of
dignity and respect, and also to ensure that the
offender's punishment corresponds to the full extent
of the harm caused. 9 In effect, such testimony seeks
to influence courts to redress the specific harm
suffered by victims. 10
Ostensibly, the victim rights' movement has
sought to alter the criminal justice system to reflect the
proper balance between the interests of victims and the
rights of criminal defendants. I I This balance cannot
ignore, however, the principle that the sentencing
process must necessarily focus on the particular
characteristics of the offender and the direct
circumstances of the crime. 12
Victim impact

7Kathryn E. Bartolo, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role
of Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital Sentencing
Proceedings, 77 IOWAL. REv. 1217, 1219 (1992)(observing that
the victim's movement "seeks to reform the process by giving
greater weight to the interests of other parties affected by crime
- namely victims") (footnote omitted).

8See Fahey, supra note 1, at 211 (noting such testimony is one of
"the most controversial means of vindicating victim's interests").
9See id. at211-12.
I°See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1219.
IISee Fahey, supra note I, at 210; Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Many citizens have
found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a
parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pressures beyond
normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his
crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing authority the full
reality of human suffering the defendant has produced ....").
12See Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform
or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 391, 398 (1989) ("The
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testimony immediately before sentencing introduces
elements of retaliation and personal vengeance into the
proceedings. 13 The practical impact of such testimony
must therefore be analyzed against the erosion of a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. 14

B. Booth v. Maryland
In need of money to satiate their heroin habit,
between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. on May 18, 1983, John
Marvin Booth and Willie Reid entered the Baltimore
home of Irvin and Rose Bronstein. IS Aware that their
robbery victims knew Booth, the conspirators
separately bound and gagged both Mr. and Mrs.
Bronstein. 16 Booth then stabbed Mr. Bronstein in the
chest twelve times, while Reid administered a dozen
equally fatal stab wounds to Mrs. Bronstein. 17 The
Bronsteins' bodies were found in their living room by
their son on May 20. 18
Booth's first trial ended in a mistrial. I9 At his
second trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, Booth was convicted as a principal in
the first degree of the premeditated and felony murder
of Mr. Bronstein. 20 At the bifurcated capital sentencing proceeding, the trial judge admitted victim
impact statements pursuant to a recently enacted
statute. 21
The victim impact evidence included a statement
by the Bronsteins' son that "his parents were not
killed, but were butchered like animals," and that he

sentencer is then implicitly encouraged to weigh the relative
blameworthiness of the offender and the victim.") (footnote
omitted).
13See id.
14See id. at 397.
IS See Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 182, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103
(1986) (hereinafter Booth I).
16/d. at 185, 507 A.2dat 1104.
17Id.

18See id. at 181,507 A.2d at 1103.
19See Booth v. State, 301 Md. 1,481 A.2d 505 (1984).
20See Booth I, 306 Md. at 182,507 A.2d at 1103.
21See id. at 222-223,507 A.2d at 1123-1124; see Md. Ann. Code,
art. 41, § 124 (Supp. 1995).
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did not "think anyone should be able to do something
like that and get away with it."22 The evidence
introduced also included a statement by the victims'
daughter that "animals wouldn't do this. They didn't
have to kill because there was no one to stop them
from looting .... The murders show the viciousness
of the killers' [sic] anger-" and the daughter further
opined that she did not "feel that the people who did
this could ever be rehabilitated."23
Relying on its analysis in Lodowski v. State, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected Booth's
argument that the introduction of such victim impact
evidence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by injecting an arbitrary factor into the
capital sentencing proceeding.24 In affirming Booth's
death sentence, the Court of Appeals rejected the
assertion that the victims' statements may have
allowed the sentencing jury to impermissibly act upon
"passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."25
The United States Supreme Court then granted a
writ of certiorari to resolve whether the Constitution
prohibits a jury from considering a "victim impact
statement" during the sentencing phase of a capital
murder tria1. 26 A narrow five justice majority reversed
Booth's death sentence. Writing for the Court, Justice
Powell recognized that "a jury's discretion to impose
the death sentence must be 'suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action. "'27 Powell reasoned that this
necessarily individualized determination must reflect

22Booth 1,306 Md. at 236,507 A.2d at 1131 (Cole, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
23Id. at 238,507 A.2d at 1132 (Cole, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
24See id. at 222-23,507 A.2d at 1123-1124.
25See id. at 223,507 A.2d at 1124 ("We have also reviewed the
particular victim impact statement submitted in this case. Given
the nature of the subject matter, it is a relatively straightforward
and factual description of the effects of these murders on
members of the Bronstein family.") (emphasis added).
26See Booth v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
7
2 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (hereinafter
Booth II) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)
(plurality opinion».

Articles
the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral
guilt."28 "To do otherwise would create the risk that a
death sentence will be based on considerations that are
'constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to
the sentencing process. "'29
In concluding that victim impact evidence
created an unacceptable risk that a death sentence
would be imposed in an arbitrary manner, the Court
reasoned that such evidence is "wholly unrelated to
the blameworthiness of [the] particular defendant. "30
Justice Powell further reasoned that the decision on
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
may not "tum on the perception that the victim was a
sterling member of the community rather than
someone of questionable character."31 Thus, over the
vigorous dissent of four justices,32 the Supreme
Court's decision in Booth almost entirely barred the
introduction of victim impact evidence to a sentencing
jury in a capital proceeding. 33
Eleven days after Booth was decided, Justice
Powell retired,34 and he was replaced by the relatively
conservative Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.35 Accordingly, when the Supreme Court's 1987-88 term began,

28See id (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982».
29See id (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983».
30Id at 504.
31ld at 506 (footnote omitted).
32See id. at 515-519 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist); id at 519-521
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justices White and O'Connor
and Chief Justice Rehnquist).
33Cf id The Supreme Court's resolution of the case necessarily
left open the question of the degree to which victim impact
testimony would be admissible in non-capital cases. Also
unresolved was the admissibility of such evidence when heard by
ajudge, as opposed to a sentencingjury.
34See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering - A Personal
Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 21, 33 (1992).
35See, e.g., United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Wiley, 794 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1986). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986); Vickers
v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1986).

five sitting justices were potentially inclined to
overturn Booth. 36 However, when initially confronted
in 1989 with the opportunity to recognize the
constitutionality of victim impact testimony in a
capital sentencing proceeding, Justice White declined
the invitation to overturn Booth. 37 Ultimately, the
issue returned to the Court in 1991, when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review Tennessee's
imposition of a death sentence subsequent to the
introduction of victim impact testimony. 38

C. Payne v. Tennessee
On June 27, 1987, Pervis Tyrone Payne passed
the early morning and afternoon hours ingesting
cocaine, beer, and malt liquor while awaiting the
return of his girlfriend. 39 Apparently agitated by his
girlfriend's absence, and presumably impaired from
his consumption of mind-altering substances, Payne
entered the apartment of Charisse Christopher, who
lived across the hall from Payne's girlfriend with her
two year-old daughter Lacie and her three year-old son
Nicholas. 40 When Christopher resisted Payne's sexual
advances, he turned violent. 41
Attacking Christopher with a butcher's knife,
Payne inflicted 84 wounds with 41 separate thrusts
which aggregately killed Christopher due to severe
blood loss.42 Next to her mother's body on the kitchen
floor, police found Lacie's corpse with stab wounds to
the chest, abdomen, back, and head. 43 Miraculously,
even though he suffered multiple stab wounds which

36See Berger, supra note 34, at 33-34.
37See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989)
(White, J, concurring) ("Unless Booth v. Maryland is to be

overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed.") (citation
omitted); see also Berger, supra note 34, at 37-40 (discussing the
Supreme Court's dismissal of "improvidently granted" certiorari
in a Booth-related case, Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 336 (1991
38See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991).
39See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 812 (1991).
4°See id at 811-812.
41See id at 812.
42See id at 813.

».

43See id.

27.2 U. Bait. L. F.33
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completely penetrated his body from front to back,
Payne's third victim, Nicholas, survived the attack
after seven hours of surgery. 44 Payne's criminal lark
left the walls and floor of the Christopher apartment
covered with blood. 45 When the police found Payne
exiting Christopher's apartment building, he looked as
ifhe was "sweating blood."46
Rejecting the defendant's testimony that another,
unidentified assailant perpetrated the orgy of criminality in the Christopher apartment prior to Payne's
innocent arrival at the scene, a jury convicted Payne
on two counts of first-degree murder, and one count of
assault with intent to murder in the first degree. 47 At
the bifurcated capital sentencing phase of the trial,
four defense witnesses took the stand, pleading for the
jury to spare Payne's life. 48 In contrast, the state
offered the impact testimony of Nicholas' grandmother:
[Nicholas] cries for his mom. He doesn't
seem to understand why she doesn't come
home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He
cries to me many times during the week
and asks me, Grandmarnma, do you miss
my Lacie? And I tell him yes. He says,
I'm worried about my Lacie. 49
The prosecutor further emphasized this emotional
testimony in rebuttal to Payne's closing argument:
You [heard] what Nicholas Christopher will
carry in his mind forever. When you talk
about cruel, when you talk about atrocious,
and when you talk about heinous, that
picture will always come into your mind,
probably throughout the rest of your lives.
. .. [Petitioner's attorney] wants you to
think about a good reputation . . .. He
doesn't want you to think about the people

44See id.
4SSee id
46See id at 812.
47See id. at 813-814.
48See id. at 814.
491d at 814-815.
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who love Charisse Christopher, her mother
and daddy who loved her. The people who
loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who
are still here. The brother who mourns for
her every single day .... 50
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the jury's
sentence of death on each murder count. 51
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 52
to revisit the Court's former decisions in Booth and
South Carolina v. Gathers which had held that victim
impact evidence was precluded from consideration in
a capital sentencing proceeding by the Eighth
Amendment. 53
With Justice White joining Justice Kennedy and
the three remaining Booth dissenters, the Court
reversed Booth and Gathers. 54 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Booth and Gathers
were based upon the dual premises that only evidence
relating to blameworthiness is relevant at a capital
sentencing proceeding, and that victim impact evidence does not reflect the offender's blameworthiness. 55 Rehnquist rejected the latter premise:
[T]he assessment of harm caused by the
defendant as a result of the crime charged
has understandably been an important
concern of the criminal law . . . in
determining the appropriate punishment.
Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal
defendants may be guilty of different
offenses solely because their acts cause
differing amounts of harm. 56

SOld at 815-16.

slSee State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990).
S2See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991).
S3See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991).

S4See id at 830 n.2 (noting that the Payne holding did not address
the admissibility of a "victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant,
and the appropriate sentence").
sSSee id at 819.
S6ld ("If a bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger,
and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun
unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both
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The Payne majority observed that where a judge is
given broad discretion in determining the appropriate
sentence for a specific crime, the consideration of the
harm caused by the crime is an essential factor in
properly exercising that discretion. 57 Thus, the Court
reasoned that allowing states to introduce victim
impact evidence was constitutionally permissible to
illustrate each victim's "uniqueness as an individual
human being. "58 Invoking the long shadow cast by
Williams v. New York, the Court concluded that victim
impact evidence is a permissible method "of informing
the sentencing authority about the specific harm
caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general
type long considered by sentencing authorities."59
Implicitly concluding that the victim impact testimony
presented by the State of Tennessee was not so unduly
prejudicial so as to deprive Payne of a fair trial, the
Supreme Court affirmed Payne's death sentence~O

application, retribution punishes an offender in
relation to both the harm inflicted and the moral
wrongfulness of the act. 62 During the 1950s, the
predominant goals of punishment in the American
criminal justice system shifted from retribution and
incapacitation63 to general deterrence64 and the
rehabilitation of the offender. 65 This trend was
illustrated by California's indeterminate sentencing
provisions, where the length of prison sentences for
most crimes committed was left almost entirely to the
discretion of penological authorities. 66 As Chief
Justice Rehnquist has noted, however, "the pendulum
has swung back."67 General disdain for the proposition that most criminals can be rehabilitated to any
significant degree has once again shifted the focus of
punishment to the core of retributive theory: the moral
wrongfulness and the actual harm caused by the act. 68
This second, or "actual harm" element of

II. THE FOUR THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

A

s exemplified by biblical law and the Code
ofHammurabi, early theories of sentencing
focused upon retribution. 61 Strictly retrospective in

instances is identical, but his responsibility in the fonner is
greater.") (quoting Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (l987)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
57See id at 821 ('''We think it desirable for the [sentencer] to
have as much infonnation before it as possible when it makes the
sentencing decision."') (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
204 (l976)(plurality)).

58Id. at 823; see id. at 826 ("[T]h[is] testimony illustrated quite
poignantly some of the hann that Payne's killing had caused;
there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind
that harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence
introduced by the defendant.") (emphasis added).
59Id. at 825; see also id at 821 ("While the admission of this
particular kind of evidence - designed to portray for the
sentencing authority the actual harm caused by a particular crime
is of recent origin, this fact hardly renders it
unconstitutional.") (citations omitted).
60See id. at 825 ("[T]he evidence adduced in this case was
illustrative of the harm caused by Payne's double murder.").
61 See Susan Ann Comille, Note, Retribution's "Harm"
Component and the Victim Impact Statement: Finding a
Workable Model, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 389, 396 (1993).

62See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital
Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107, 162-63 (1995-96).
63See J.M. BURNS & J.S. MATTINA, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING,
AND CORRECTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 13 (Nicholas
N. Kittrie & Elyce H. Zenoff, eds., Foundation Press 1981) ("A
second great purpose of sentencing is that of separation of the
criminal defendant from society. This end is sometimes referred
to as incapacitation.... The separation rationale assumes that the
conduct in these crimes is so serious and the chance of repetition
so great that the judge, acting for society, must conclude that
protection of the public is the primary objective.").
64See id. at 12-13 ("[G]eneral deterrence ... rests on the notion
that by the sentence imposed on an individual defendant, and by
communication of that sentence to others who might commit
similar crimes, the latter will forego their projected criminal
behavior out of fear they will suffer the same or similar
sentence.")(internal quotations omitted); see Grossman, supra
note 62, at 164.
65See Comille, supra note 61, at 396-97 ("The rehabilitative
model is founded upon the premise that a criminal can be cured
of his tendency to commit crime through treatment. Since the
focus is upon the criminal defendant, concern for the victim
becomes secondary.") (footnotes omitted).

66See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820 (1991).
67Id.
68See Comille, supra note 61, at 397; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at
819-821.

27.2 U. Bait. L. F. 35
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retribution has emerged as the principle theory69
justifying the introduction of victim impact testimony
immediately prior to sentencing: "Victim impact
evidence is simply another form or method of
informing the sentencing authority about the specific
harm caused by the crime in question."70 Such
testimony offers a glimpse of the life upon which the
defendant chose to inflict harm, and also demonstrates
the injury to the victim, the victim's family, and to
society.71 This testimony is therefore relevant to the
sentencing determination because it indicates the full
extent of the emotional and psychological harm caused
by the offender's act. 72 Thus, the argument proceeds,
full consideration of the level of harm caused by the
defendant's crime is necessary to fashion a
proportional sentence which inflicts a punishment
reflecting what the offender justly deserves. 73
Initially appealing, the retributionist justification
for the introduction of victim impact testimony fails
under stricter scrutiny. Retribution is based upon
principles of equality which demand that the offender
recelve punishment commensurate with the
sentencer's objective determinations of moral
blameworthiness and the harm caused by the criminal
acts.74 By contrast, inherently subjective victim

6~either

incapacitation nor general deterrence has been
advanced to justify the introduction of victim impact testimony.
If it is true that such testimony might aid in the rehabilitation of
the offender, then it follows such testimony would assist
rehabilitation when presented in any forum besides the inherently
prejudicial atmosphere of a sentencing proceeding. See Long,
supra note 4, at 213.
70Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; see Comille, supra note 61, at 401 ("In
the context of retribution, victim impact statements are relevant
because they provide the sentencer with an assessment of the
harm component. A retributivist needs to consider harm along
with blameworthiness in order to calculate an appropriate
sentence.") (footnotes omitted).

71See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367,397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting».
72See Comille, supra note 61, at 416.
73See id; Grossman, supra note 62, at 162-63.
7·See BURNS & MATTINA, supra note 63, at 39-40 (quoting
IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRUNDE DER
REICHTSLEHRE (T. & T. Clark 1887».
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impact testimony is not competent to offer an
objective determination of the actual harm caused by
a criminal act for two reasons. 75 First, crime victims
react in a plethora of ways, and any individual's
reaction to a single criminal act will be a subjective
response to those unique circumstances. 76 Second, no
process has been persuasively advanced which allows
for the accurate and objective assessment of victim
harm to be comprehensively applied in a practical
fashion throughout the entire criminal justice system. 77
Any sentencer is thus compelled to apply victim
impact testimony in an arbitrary, emotional, and
subjective fashion.
The use of victim impact testimony is more
appropriately analyzed in terms of personal revenge
rather than retribution. 78 Retribution is a rationally
proportioned punishment fixed by society through its
elected representatives; conversely, personal revenge
is arbitrarily inflicted by the victim and knows no
principled limitations. 79 Information offered by a
grieving victim or third party encourages the sentencer
to sympathize with these individuals, and to accord
weight to information offered solely for the purpose of
imposing a harsher penalty to the offender. 80 This
deference to personal vengeance is not an acceptable
justification for punishment. 81
Victim impact testimony thus impermissibly
invites the sentencer to extract punishment beyond the

75See Fahey, supra note I, at 256 ("It is difficult to see how this
standard can be met with the use of information which is
inherently subjective.") (emphasis added).
76See Long, supra note 4, at 217.
77See Comille, supra note 61, at 414.
78See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1243 ("[I]ndividual vengeance is
not accepted as a justification for punishment."); see also Fahey,
supra note I, at 261 ("The evidence encourages sentencers to
sympathize with not only the victim, but also the survivors.").
79See Fahey, supra note I, at 262.
80See id But see Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal
Court: The Need/or Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 244
(1991) (observing evidence of victims' desire to extract personal
vengeance is inconclusive).
81See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1243.
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reasonably foreseeable effects of a specific crime. 82
The touchstone of our criminal justice system is a
criminal code representing measured, communal
blame as articulated by the legislature. 83 Fundamental
notions of justice therefore demand that the offender
should be punished only for the results of reasonably
foreseeable acts which have been proscribed as
criminal by the legislature, rather than attenuated,
unforeseeable emotional harm to the victim or to third
parties. 84 In other words, the only harm to the victim
which may justify enhanced punishment is the harm
which "is both foreseeable to the defendant and clearly
identified in advance of the crime by the legislature as
class a/harm that should in every case result in more
severe punishment."8s Bentham hypothesized that if
crimes of unequal gravity were punished equally, then
"the public would lose the important ability to
distinguish serious wrongs from more trivial ones."86
A fair extension of this corollary is that equal crimes
should not be punished unequally based upon
fortuitous, unforseen circumstances. 87 To legitimately
reflect retributionist theory, differences in punishment
must reflect objectively identifiable differences in
either moral blameworthiness or in reasonably
foreseeable actual harm as clearly articulated by the
legislature in proscribing criminal conduct. 88 To the
contrary, victim impact testimony encourages punishment based upon arbitrary, post hoc appraisals of
personal vengeance rather than established standards
of communal blame. 89 "The victim's opinion is

82See Fahey, supra note 1, at 241.
83See Hall, supra note 80, at 260.
84Cf id. at 261 ("Another concern ... is the issue of whether
victim participation statutes are logically or practically consistent
with structured or guided sentencing procedures. ").

85See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 863 (1991) (Stevens, 1.,
dissenting) (emphasis added); see Fahey, supra note 1,239-41.
86Grossman, supra note 62, at 167.
87See Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987)(noting that such
arbitrariness relies upon considerations '''constitutionally
impennissible [and] totally irrelevant to the sentencing process"')
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983».
88See Hall, supra note 80, at 260.

891d. at 261.

irrelevant to any legitimate sentencing factor .... "90

III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

T

he basic tenet of faith upon which our
predecessors founded the United States of
America was the stated premise that "all men are
created equal."9J As Justice Marshall observed, the
historical record adequately signifies that our
forefathers did not feel compelled to practice in fact
this belief they so eloquently stated in theory. 92 As the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution demonstrates, however, the principles of
Equal Protection guaranteed by that amendment are
evolutionary in nature. 93 Thus, our judicial system
should no more be limited by recently propounded
interpretations of Equal Protection that do not
vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment than it was wed
to illegitimate, archaic dogma bearing the imprimatur
of racism. 94
It is gospel to our Equal Protection jurisprudence
that the State may not arbitrarily select one individual,
or class of individuals, and inflict upon them a penalty
which is not imposed upon others equally guilty of the

90See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 429.
91THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).

92See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial a/the
United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1,2-5 (1987).
93See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; see also Marshall, supra note
92, at 2-5.

94Cf Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs ... are ... deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.") (citation omitted); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority .... We cannot accept this proposition.");
id. at 555 (Harlan, John Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[S]uch
legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not only with
the equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and
State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within
the United States.").
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same offense. 95 This prohibition extends with equal
force to laws which, though fair and impartial on their
face, are administered in a discriminatory fashion. 96
The Equal Protection Clause also requires the
State to extend identical protection against criminal
conduct to every individual's life and liberty.97 Thus,
"the protection given by the laws of the States shall be
equal in respect to life and liberty ... no matter how
poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how
ignorant" the person. 98 America's original Fourteenth
Amendment principles therefore bar treating similarly
situated victims of crime differently based upon a
victim's subjective characteristics.
As Booth acknowledged, the consequence of
allowing the introduction of victim impact evidence is
the inescapable practical effect that offenders will
receive harsher punishment for committing criminal
acts against victims deemed by society to be more
worthy ofprotection. 99 Introduction of victim impact
testimony compels the inescapable inference that
courts can and should assess a defendant's wrong
according to the relative weight of the victim's
societal merits.loo "Since every victim is unique, the
presentation of this information can 'only be intended
to identify some victims as more worthy of protection
than others. "'101
Concededly, current Equal Protection analysis
does not lend itself to successfully assailing victim

9SSee Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150,

impact evidence on that ground. Defendants unfairly
prejudiced by the introduction of such testimony are
neither members of a suspect classification,102 nor is
equal treatment for crimes against similarly situated
victims one of the few fundamental rights recognized
within the Equal Protection framework. l03 This
practical reality, however, does not conceal the
conspicuous fact that the determination of criminal
sanctions based upon the subjective traits of the victim
has been given actual "backdoor" effect via victim
impact evidence.104 Although the law does not allow
the sentencer to weigh relative characteristics of the
victim in apportioning an appropriate punishment, 105
victim impact evidence effectively sanctions this
methodology. In doing so, victim impact testimony
repudiates the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment that "all men are equal in the rights of life
and liberty before the majesty of American law."106

IV. DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A. Introduction
In contrast to Equal Protection, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides fertile
ground on which to attack unfairly prejudicial victim
impact testimony. 107 In Williams v. New York, the
Supreme Court established the modem principle that
the Constitution does not bar ajudge from considering
all relevant evidence in fashioning an appropriate
criminal sentence. 108
A generation later, however, the Court narrowed

153-61 (1897) ("[A]lways [presuming good faith on the part of
a legislature] is to make the protecting clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment a mere rope ofsand.") (emphasis added).

96See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
97See Berger, supra note 34, at 47 n.130; Jacobus tenBroek,
Equal Under Law 230-31 (Collier 1951).
98CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1865)
(Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, recognized as the
author of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally.
tenBroek, supra note 97, at 320.

99See Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987); Fahey, supra note

I02See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 V.S.
432 (1985).

103See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
I04See Fahey, supra note I, at 247 ("If such a facial classification
of victim consideration would be invalid, how could the
[Supreme] Court ever permit the same comparisons to be made
implicitly through the use of victim impact evidence?").

1, at 243-44.

IOSState v. Cadwallader, 434 N. W.2d 506, 509-10 (Neb. 1989).

lOoSee Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 28 (Alaska 1977)
(Boochever, C.]., dissenting).

I06CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1865).

IOISee Fahey, supra note I, at 244 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at
866 (Stevens, J., dissenting».
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107See Payne v. Tennessee, 50 I V.S. 808, 836 (1991 )(Souter, J.,
concurring).
108See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
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this doctrine by declaring "it is now clear that the
sentencing process ... must satisfy the requirements
of the Due Process Clause."I09 A defendant therefore
has a constitutional interest in the integrity of the
sentencing procedure, even though that defendant may
have no right to object to the particular sentence
actually imposed. I 10
Thus, the threshold inquiry is "what process is
due?"11I "To comply with due process . . . the
sentencing court must assure itself that the information
upon which it bases the sentence is reliable and
accurate. "112 Consequently, inflammatory victim impact testimony which causes the sentencer to act upon
passion and emotion, rather than reason and
deliberation, so infects the sentencing proceeding with
unfair prejudice as to render the result a denial of due
process. I 13
B. Cianos v. State
In apparent harmony with this constitutional
mandate, section 780 of Article 27 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland provides that at the request of the
State's Attorney, and within the sound discretion of
the trial court, a victim may address the "sentencing
judge or jury under oath or affirmation before the
imposition of a sentence. "114 Reflecting the recent
trend that "a victim of crime has a constitutional right
to be treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity
during all phases of the criminal justice process,"IIS on
November 8, 1994, the voters of the State of Maryland
approved Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, which provides, inter alia, that "a victim of
crime shall have the right . . . upon request and if

practicable . .. to be heard at a criminal proceeding,
as these rights ... are specified by law."116
In reviewing the sentence imposed upon Sean
Patrick Hall after his conviction for two counts of
automobile manslaughter, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland recently clarified the allocution rights of
victims at a sentencing proceeding. JI7 The Court of
Appeals held that the representatives of Hall's victims
were precluded from challenging a final criminal
judgment, even though they had been denied the
opportunity to verbally address the court prior to the
imposition of Hall's sentence. 118 The Court of
Appeals, however, was not content to merely dispose
of the case at hand. In considered though extensive
dicta, Maryland's court of last resort proceeded to
opme:
The mandate of the people is clear. In
response to that mandate, trial judges must
give appropriate consideration to the
impact of crime upon the victims. An
important step towards accomplishing that
task is to accept victim impact testimony
wherever possible. Therefore, ordinarily a
request by the sentencing judge to the
victims that they waive their right to
address the court as to the impact of the
crimes upon them should not be made . ..
. [P]etitioners were arguably denied their
rights guaranteed by Md. Code §
[780](a).119
The implication of this language is clear: The Court of
Appeals has dismissed the discretionary language of
Article 47 and section 780, and in its place has
mandated an almost irrebuttable presumption that
victims, or their representatives, shall have the right to

I09Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality).
II°See id; see also State v. Conn, 669 P.2d 581, 583 (Ariz. 1983).
II IMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).

116Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. 47 (emphasis added).
117See Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 659 A.2d 291 (1995).

I12People v. Outley, 610 N.E.2d 356, 360 (N.Y. 1993).

118See id at 411, 659 A.2d at 293-94 ("An appeal by a victim is

I13Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, 1., concurring).

collateral to and may not interrupt a criminal case, and such an
appeal cannot result in a reversal of the judgment and a
reopening of the case.").

114MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 780 (1996). Unless otherwise
specified, all subsequent statutory references are to MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27 (1996).
liS 1994 Md. Laws 102, at 1195-96.
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Id at 413, 659 A.2d at 295 (emphasis partially added) (internal
citations omitted).
1
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testify prior to the imposition of a criminal sentence. 120

c.

Victim Impact Testimony's Sole Purpose

Fundamental notions of fairness require that the
imposition of a criminal sentence be a reasoned
response to both the harmful effects of the crime and
the moral blameworthiness of the criminal. I21 As the
Supreme Court has cogently recognized:
It is no doubt constitutionally permissible,
if not constitutionally required, for the
State to insist that the individualized
assessment of the appropriateness of the ..
. penalty [be] a moral inquiry into the
culpability of the defendant, and not an
emotional response to the . .. evidence. 122
In other words, irrelevant information or inflammatory
rhetoric that diverts the sentencer's attention or invites
an irrational, purely subjective response is repugnant
to the elemental notions of fairness guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123
The inherently cathartic testimony of victims, or their
representatives, requires a sentencer's focus to shift to
subject matter not bearing upon the defendant's
culpability or the circumstances of the offense: "The
passion and prejudice that results from this type of
testimony does not require explanation."124
Victim impact evidence has generally been
characterized within one of three broad categories. 125
The first broad category concerns testimony about the

I20See Dix v. County of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir.
1992) (Kozinski, J.) (by analogy, setting forth a two-prong test
for individual State establishment of a federally enforceable
procedural due process right for victims to testify at State
criminal proceedings).
I2ISee infra Part II.
122Saflle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1990) (emphasis added)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
123People v. Raley, 830 P.2d 712,742 (Cal. 1992).
124Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 781, 490 A.2d 1228, 1274
(1985) (Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
12SSee Hall, supra note 80, at 255-56.
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direct harm to the victim flowing from the
circumstances of the crime. 126 Second, victim
testimony may indicate the psychological or
physiological impact upon the victim, or upon the
victim's family and friends, that results from the
offender's act. 127 Third, in some cases, the sentencer
is allowed to hear a victim's opinion as to the
character of the offender, or as to the sentence which
should ultimately be imposed.1 28 As will be shown,
none of these categories contributes to an objective
sentence based upon either the offender's moral
blameworthiness or the harm caused by the crime.
The first broad category of victim impact
testimony portrays to the sentencing authority the
subjective harm caused by a specific crime. 129 This
category of testimony suffers from a number of
defects. Foremost is the clear implication that the
offender receives a windfall at sentencing when the
harm to the victim is less than the offender intended. 130
Moreover, as the inquiry moves farther away from the
verifiable, objective consequences of the criminal act,
a sentence imposed by considering "a quick glimpse
of the life" of the victim is more likely to be based
upon the arbitrary, subjective characteristics of the
victim and the subjective, emotional response of the
sentencer. 13 I
The second broad category of impact testimony
relates to the psychological or physiological effects
upon the victim, or the victim's family and friends.132
Within this class of testimony, the Supreme Court of
Idaho has allowed the introduction of the statement: "I

126See Comille, supra note 61, at 394-95.
127See Hall, supra note 80, at 256.
12BSee Comille, supra note 61, at 395.
129See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).
IJOSee Hall, supra note 80, at 255.
1J1See id. at 255-56; Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.

132e! Payne, 501 U.S. at 826 ("It is an affront to the civilized
members of the human race to say that at sentencing in a capital
case, a parade of witnesses may praise the background, character
and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this case), without
limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears
upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.")
(quoting Payne, 791 S.W.2dat 19).
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think someone could probably have cut off my right
arm, and I would not have missed it as much as I have
my daughter."133 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has allowed a daughter's statement, "who is
going to be my daddy now that my daddy is gone" and
testimony that a father "often has chest pains as if a
bullet pierces through his right lung - where [the
victim] was hit at close range with a gun ShOt."134 It is
difficult to fathom how such inflammatory testimony
objectively demonstrates "the loss to the victim's
family and to society."J35
The third genre of impact testimony allows the
victim or the victim's representatives to offer opinion
as to the offender's character, or as to an appropriate
sentence. 136 Ignoring the admonition that such
testimony is merely a biased opinion from someone
having "a great personal interest in the outcome,"137 a
victim's mother has been allowed to testify: "I feel
that the death penalty is a fair penalty, and I believe
that under the law it should be administered in a case
such as this."138 Not to be outdone, Maryland's
highest court has not only sanctioned the observation,
"personally, I feel, if you kill anyone, you should be
put to death," but the Court of Appeals has also
endorsed the general theories of incapacitation and
deterrence introduced by a victim's wife at the
offender's sentencing: "[I]f[appellant is] put to death,
he won't kill another policeman, and ... other people
[will] know you can't get away with it, get out in

133State v. Fain, 809 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Idaho 1991).
'34Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 767, 490 A.2d at 1228, 1268
(Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
135Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).
13 6S ee Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. While victims' family

members' opinion testimony regarding the crime, the defendant,
and the appropriate sentence was rejected by the Booth 11
majority as unconstitutional, Payne expressly refused to pass
upon the constitutionality of such testimony. See id.
I37State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ohio 1990); see State
v. Carlson, 406 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Neb. 1987)("[A] judge must
not and cannot allow the judgments and conclusions of the victim
to be substituted for those of the court in imposing sentence. To
do so constitutes an abuse of discretion.")
138Fain, 809 P.2d at 1152.

twenty years and walk the streets."139 Such testimony
represents the thinly veiled primordial scream for
personal vengeance rather than the objective
"individualized consideration"140 of a "standard for
determining the severity of the sentence that will be
meted OUt."141

D. Effect Upon The Sentencer
In addressing the effects of impact testimony
upon the sentencer, some courts have drawn a
distinction between evidence offered to a jury, and
evidence offered to a judge. 142 Other courts have more
realistically acknowledged that even where the victim
impact testimony is presented only to a judge, such
evidence may be "simply too powerful for a human
sentencer to ignore."143 Thus, in many circumstances,
ajudge may be affected as much as a jury by intensely
potent impact testimony, even though normally
accustomed to mentally excluding impermissible
evidence. 144 As Judge Weinstein has recognized:
An impractical rule of total suppression
would almost invite self-deception by a
judge forced to deny that he had considered
a factor that was strongly influencing his
subconscious reactions.
The judge's
capacity to ignore such information is
probably better than a juror's, but it is
limited. 145

139Lodowski, 302 Md. at 782, 490 A.2d at 1275 (Cole, J.,
concurring).
140Payne, 501 U.S. at 822; see also Berger, supra note 34, at
28-29.
14lPayne, 501 U.S. at 820 (quoting S. Wheeler, et aI., SITTING IN
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56
(1988}).
' 42 Randell v. State, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (Nev. 1993); People v.
Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253, 270 (Ill. 1992); State v. Keith, 754
P.2d 474, 488 (Mont. 1988).
143 See

People v. Simms, 520 N .E.2d 308, 314 (Ill. 1988).

I44See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 416; cf Hall, supra note 80,

at 246 ("[T]here is disagreement as to the extent to which the
statements actually influence judges' decisions.").
'45United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253,260 (E.D.N.Y.
I 970) (emphasis added); see Post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. 1079, 1082
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Certainly a judge is not entitled to more latitude than
a jury in imposing an arbitrary or capricious
sentence. 146 "[T]he presumption that judges know and
apply the rules of evidence should not be converted
into license to conclude that judges are inhuman,
incapable of being moved by passion as well as
reason."147
Thus, the appropriate standard under a due
process analysis is determining the point at which the
sentencer's emotional outrage to the introduction of
victim impact testimony prevents that sentencer "from
imposing a properly individualized sentence."148 It is
difficult to reconcile a rape victim's statement, "[a]fter
all, your daughter may be next," with the premise that
a sentencing judge will always, or even frequently, be
able to disregard such visceral testimony.149 "[T]here
is no reason to denigrate th[is] danger simply because
the recipients of the evidence wore judicial robes."15o

E. Non-Capital Cases
Just as it contravenes human experience to
presume victim impact evidence will not unfairly
prejudice a sentencing judge, similarly, no logical
reason exists to distinguish between the use of such
evidence in capital versus non-capital sentencing
proceedings. 151 While "death is different" under
Eighth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has
drawn no such distinction when applying the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152

(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It would be unrealistic and
unwise to presume that no judge could be moved, in both heart
and deed, by the anguish and rage expressed by a murder
victim's family.").
146See State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 320 (Idaho 1989).

147post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. at 1082 (Marshall, 1., dissenting).
148State v. Brand, 506 So. 2d 702, 706 (La. App. 1987).
149State v. Yanez, 469 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Minn. App. 1991).
ISOpost v. Ohio, 484 U.S. at 1082 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
ISISee Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 419.

IS2Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use
ofExtraneous and Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases
of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1249, 1259-60 (1993); see
State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84,87 (Wis. App. 1989) ("Although
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To the contrary, relevant constitutional precedent
unambiguously suggests that a non-capital "sentencing
process ... must satisfy the requirements of the Due
Process Clause.",s3 The fairness guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause therefore requires that in every
case the unfair prejudice of victim impact testimony
be weighed against the probative value of that
evidence. ,s4

F. Relevance
Regardless of society's desire to give the victim
of crime a greater role in America's criminal justice
system, victim impact testimony simply has no
legitimate role in a sentencing proceeding. ISS Such
testimony distracts the sentencer from the
constitutionally mandated focus upon the offender. ,s6
Additionally, such testimony substantially increases
the risk that the subsequent sentence will be imposed
in an arbitrary and capricious basis.,s7
Gardner was a death penalty case, we perceive no reason why its
rationale should not be applied to penalties of lesser
severity.")(citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977»; id.
at 87 n.7 (noting that in deciding Gardner, "Justice Stevens
relied on non-capital cases, such as Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967).").

IS3Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). While
concededly Gardner was a capital case, the Supreme Court
expressly proffered a due process justification in addition to this
factor: "[T]here have been two constitutional developments
which require us to scrutinize a State's capital-sentencing
procedures more closely than was necessary in 1949. First, five
Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death
is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country .... Second, it is now clear that the
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
IS4See Hall, supra note 80, at 255 ("[T]o the extent that these
concerns are based upon due process considerations, the capital
versus non-capital dichotomy collapses.").

ISSSee Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 767, 490 A.2d 1228,
1267 (1985)(Cole, 1., dissenting), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
IS6See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 398.
IS7See Randell Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of
Victim Impact Evidence During the Sentencing Phase of Capital
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The Supreme Court has mandated that a criminal
sentence must be "directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender."158 Indirect injury
to the victim, or the bereavement of the victim's
family, may not properly be relied upon to aggravate
an offender's sentence because these factors bear "no
rational relationship to [any] degree of culpability."159
Thus, the sympathy and prejudice aroused by victim
impact testimony undercut the constitutional
imperative that a sentence must be a "reasoned moral
response" to the offender and the crime. 160
Similarly, by its nature, victim impact testimony
demands a purely arbitrary calculus in response to its
introduction. 161 The clear implication in receiving
such testimony is that an offender's culpability will
turn not on the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of the offender's own criminal conduct; but rather
upon fortuitous factors, such as the composition of the
victim's family:162
I cannot comprehend how the victim's
social and charitable activities and the
extent of the parents' grief can be considered as part of 'the offense and the
circumstances surrounding it' and therefore
pertinent to sentencing. 163
While invoking sympathy, such evidence does not
guide the sentencer's discretion in a permissible
manner. To the contrary, victim impact testimony
impermissibly invites increased punishment based, not
upon the crime or the criminal, but upon the
fortuitous, subjective characteristics of the victim. 164

Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 589, 624 (1992).
ls8Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987).
ls9Peopie v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287 (Cal. App. 1984).

160See Fahey, supra note 1, at 252 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 493 (1990».
161See Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir.
1987).
62
1 See Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
163Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 27 (Alaska 1977)(Boochever,
C.J., dissenting).
164Lodowski, 302 Md. at 765-66, 490 A.2d at 1266 (Cole, J.,
concurring).

A criminal sentence should be fashioned "to the facts
and circumstances surrounding the crime and the
individual then being sentenced. "165 Victim impact
testimony relates to neither of these factors and is
therefore irrelevant in a sentencing proceeding.166

G. Inherent Flaws
Victim impact testimony additionally suffers
from several inherently prejudicial flaws which
counsel against its introduction during a sentencing
proceeding. 167 Studies which suggest uneven and
minimal participation of victims, or their representatives, at sentencing proceedings support the
premise that victim impact testimony which
contributes to aggravating a sentence in anyone case
is the functional equivalent of "lightning striking" that
particular offender. 168
The impossibility of formulating discernible,
judicial standards at the appellate level to determine if
a trial court has been unfairly prejudiced by impact
testimony is a second inherent flaw in allowing victim

16SId at 773,490 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Henry v. State, 273 Md.
131, 150, 328 A.2d 293, 304 (1974».

166See Robison, 829 F.2d at 1505 ("[T]he lesson taught in Booth
is equally applicable here because the underlying reasoning for
limiting the scope of evidence allows for no distinction between
misdirected evidence offered by either party"); Lodowski, 302
Md. at 774, 490 A.2d at 1270 (Cole, 1., concurring) ("Manifestly,
the survivors of the murder victims cannot relate any relevant
facts concerning the circumstances of the murders because the
survivors were not present at the time of the crime."); cf Gathers,
490 U.S. 805, 811 ("Notwithstanding that the papers had been
admitted into evidence for another purpose, their content cannot
be said to relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.")
(emphasis added).
167See Robison, 829 F.2d at 1503-05 (questioning whether a
victim's representative's views against administering the death
penalty must be admitted); Coyne, supra note 157, at 627-28
(questioning whether defense counsel is required to impugn the
character of a victim); Berger, supra note 34, at 54-57
(questioning whether racial or other biases are augmented by the
introduction of such testimony).

168See Hall, supra note 80, at 241-43 (citing a study that victims
or victim representatives made an oral statement in less than ten
percent of the cases); Berger, supra note 34, at 48.
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testimony.169 "Unlike a verdict of guilt or innocence,
sentencing decisions involve subjective factors."17o
Another fatal flaw which accompanies victim
impact evidence is the mere appearance of unfair
prejudice which accompanies the introduction of such
testimony. 171 As Justice Marshall noted, "victim
impact evidence [is] inadmissable because it create [s]
a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the sentencer
would impose the . . . penalty in an arbitrary
manner."172 Hence, due process guarantees are
implicated not only at the point where unfair prejudice
can be proven, but rather at the mere introduction of
such evidence.173
H. The Darden Standard
Where no specific constitutional right has been
abridged, the general standard to determine if
improperly admitted evidence violates the Due
Process Clause is whether the violation "so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resul[t] ... a
denial of due process."174 In the context of victim
impact evidence, the appropriate constitutional inquiry
is whether victim testimony risks a sentence "based on
passion, not deliberation."175 In other words, does

169See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 420 ("The Maryland Court
of Appeals found the V.I.S. to be 'relatively straightforward and
factual.' Yet the Supreme Court found the same V.I.S. to be
'emotionally charged and prejudicial.' If the same V.I.S. can be
viewed in two ways by two courts, it will be difficult to achieve
a uniform standard distinguishing between victim evidence that
is forbidden, and victim evidence that is admissible.") (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
17°People v. Simms, 520 N.E.2d 308, 315 (1988).
I7ISee Post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1988)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
172/d. (internal citations omitted).
17l/d.

174Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974».
17SPayne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (l991)(Souter, J.,
concurring) ("Evidence about the victims and survivors, and any
jury argument predicated on it, can of course be so inflammatory
as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not
deliberation.").
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such testimony threaten to inflame the passions of the
sentencer "more than did the facts of the crime?"176
The Fourteenth Amendment thus requires the trial
judge to balance these factors in each particular case
to ensure the introduction of victim impact testimony
does not violate the defendant's due process rights. 177
The dicta of the Ganos majority is repugnant to
this constitutional requirement of individualized
assessment. 178 Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that the Due Process Clause "include [s] certain
evidentiary principles which override state rules with
which they conflict."179 Thus, the probative value of
evidence introduced by the State is an issue of
constitutional magnitude. 180
The rule of Ganos scorns any assessment of the
probative value of specific victim impact evidence.
Indeed, any such balancing of "probative value"
against "unfair prejudice" would leave little such
testimony admissible, because the narrow probative
value of such evidence l81 pales in relation to the
tendency of such testimony to suggest imposing a
sentence on an improper, emotional basis. 182 Since the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has dictated that a trial
court ordinarily shall make no individualized
assessment of any improper effects of victim
testimony upon the sentencer's emotions or biases,

1761d. at 832 (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
1771d. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[I]n each case there is a
traditional guard against the inflammatory risk, in the trial
judge's authority and responsibility to control the proceedings
consistently with due process . ...") (emphasis added).
178See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.

179Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and
Argument After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1027,
1040 (l993) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Green v. Georgia,
442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam».
18°See id.
181See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text; see also Levy,
supra note 179, at 1044-45.
182See Levy, supra note 179, at 1046; see also Smith, supra note
152, at 1293 ("[A]ccording to Black's Law Dictionary, 'unfair
prejudice,' means 'undue tendency to suggest decision on
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily an emotional
one. "').
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such testimony may frequently taint the trial so as to
make the resulting sentence a denial of due process. 183
"Evidence that has the effect of arousing the passion
and prejudice of the sentencer does not satisfy this
constitutional standard."I84

V. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES

A

s the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has recognized, limiting the
admissibility of evidence lacking probative value
"allows for no distinction between misdirected
evidence offered by either party."185 Hence, the Due
Process Clause requires that if society wishes to
involve victims in the criminal justice process, society
must choose alternative fora besides the inherently
inflammatory arena of a sentencing hearing. 186 Cited
examples of such alternatives include the prevention
of crime through neighborhood watch programs or
citizens' police academies. 187 Most significant,
however, is the practical reality that victims are
represented at the sentencing proceeding through their
elected lawmakers, through prosecutors elected by the
community, and through the judges appointed by, and
the police hired by, popularly elected executive
officials. 188

VI. CONCLUSION

V

ictim impact testimony impermissibly
allows a sentencing authority to impose a
punishment based neither upon the offender's moral
blameworthiness nor the direct circumstances of the
crime. 189 As Justice Stevens recognized in his Payne
\83See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).
184Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 765, 490 A.2d 1228, 1266
(1985)(Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
18sRobison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (lOth Cir. 1987).
186See Berger, supra note 34, at 65.
187See Long, supra note 4, at 226.
188See id. at 219-21.
189See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.

dissent, such evidence of victim impact may "have
strong political appeal but no proper place in a
reasoned judicial opinion."19o It is a fundamental
premise of American jurisprudence that if a legislature
wishes to impose a penalty graduated to a particular
harm, then the legislature should classify that harm. 191
To the contrary, victim impact evidence graduates
punishment based upon fortuitous, arbitrary, and
inflammatory considerations:
There is a world of difference between
presenting the basic facts necessary for the
judge to be informed adequately of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and
including an emotion-laden narrative
pertaining to the victim. 192
Since, under Maryland law, the trial court is not
required, nor even arguably allowed, to balance the
unfair prejUdice of victim impact testimony against its
relatively low probative value, such testimony when
offered will frequently contaminate the sentencing
proceeding with such unfairness as to result in a denial
of due process. 193
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